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SUPREME 

COURT WATCH 

By Reginald C. Oh 
In its 2002-03 Term, the United States Supreme Court handed down a key decision dealing with the issue ofrace at the state and local government levels. In Virginia v. 
Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003), the Supreme Court considered 
whether the State ofVirginia's statute banning cross burn­
ing with "an intent to intimidate a person or group ofper­
sons" violates the First Amendment. Id at 1541. The Court, 
in an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 
struck down the cross-burning statute as an unconstitutional 
restriction offree speech. Specifically, the Court held that the 
"prima facie evidence" provision ofthe cross burning statute, 
which treats any act ofcross burning as prima facie evidence 
ofthe intent to intimidate others, is facially unconstitution­
al. Id Even though the Court found Virginia's statute con­
stitutionally infirm, however, it held that state and local gov­
ernments may permissibly draft carefully tailored cross 
burning statutes, so long as the statutes target for prohibi­
tion a specific type ofcross burning-cross burning carrying 
the threat of imminent violence. Id 
This case involved a consolidated appeal involving three 
defendants convicted separately ofviolating section 18.2-423 
ofthe Virginia Criminal Code, which states, in part: "It shall 
be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of in­
timidating any person or groups ofpersons, to burn, cause to 
be burned, a cross on the property of another, highway or 
other public place." VA. CODE ANN.§ 18.2-423 (1996). On 
August 22, 1998, defendant Barry Black led a Ku Klux Klan 
rally on private property, with consent ofthe property owner. 
At the conclusion of the rally, a 25 to 30 foot cross was lit on 
fire, and as the cross burned, the Klan members played 
''Amazing Grace" over loudspeakers. A sheriff observing the 
rally arrested Black, who acknowledged that he was responsi­
ble for burning the cross. Black was convicted at trial and 
sentenced to a $2,500 fine. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1542. 
On May2, 1998, respondents Elliot and O'Mara burned 
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a cross on the property ofJames Jubilee, their African Amer­
ican next-door neighbor.Jubilee had earlier complained to 
Elliot's mother about shots being fired behind Elliot's home, 
and in apparent retaliation, Elliot and O'Mara set the cross 
on fire on Jubilee's property. Elliot and O'Mara were charged 
with attempted cross burning and conspiracy to commit cross 
burning. O'Mara pleaded guilty to both counts, but in doing 
so, reserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the 
statute. Elliot chose to defend himself at a jury trial. At El­
liot's trial, the judge instructed the jury that the Common­
wealth must prove that "the defendant intended to commit 
cross burning" and that "the defendant had the intent ofin­
timidating any person or group ofpersons." Id at 1543. The 
jury found Elliot guilty of attempted cross burning, but ac­
quitted him ofconspiracy to commit cross burning. Id 
Each respondent appealed to the Supreme Court ofVir­
ginia, arguing that section 18.2-423 is facially unconstitu­
tional. The Supreme Court ofVirginia consolidated all three 
cases and held that the statute impermissibly infringes upon 
constitutionally protected speech. It reasoned that the statute 
is "facially unconstitutional because it prohibits otherwise 
permitted speech solely on the basis ofcontent, and [because] 
the statute is overbroad." Black v. Commonwealth oJVirginia, 
553 S.E.2d 738, 740 (2001). The Commonwealth ofVir­
ginia appealed the Virginia Supreme Court's ruling to the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality, 1 held that "Vir­
ginia's statute does not run afoul ofthe First Amendment inso­
far as it bans cross burning with intent to intimidate." Black, 123 
S. Ct. at 1549. The Court struck down the statute, however, 
holding that the prirna facie evidence provision ofthe statute, 
as interpreted by the Virginia Model Jury Imtructiom, rendered 
the statute facially unconstitutional. The Court then upheld the 
reversal ofrespondent Black's conviction, but with respect to 
respondents Elliot and O'Mara, the Court vacated the judg­
ment ofthe Virginia Supreme Court and remanded the case for 
the Virginia Supreme Court to determine whether the "prirna 
facie evidence provision" is severable, and ifso, whether respon­
dents Elliot and O'Mara could be retried. Id at 1552. 
In striking down the Virginia statute, the Court focused 
its analysis on the provision of the statute stating that "[a]ny 
such burning ofa cross shall be prirna facie evidence ofan in­
tent to intimidate a person or group ofpersons." VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 18.2-423 (1996). The statutory provision creates an 
"inference" that the cross burning was indeed done with the 
intent to intimidate. Once that inference is raised, the burden 
then shifts to the defendant to disprove and rebut that initial 
inference with evidence suggesting that his or her motive was 
not to intimidate another person or persons. 
The Court held that this "prima facie evidence" provision 
violated the First Amendment, because it would create the 
possibility that the state could convict a person who burned 
a cross solely as a means of political expression, and not as a 
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means to intimidate another person. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 
1551. It is "overbroad," because it fails to distinguish between 
different types ofcross-burning, and treats them all as "prima 
facie evidence" that the act was done with the intent to in­
timidate. Thus, the Court reasoned that the "prima facie evi­
dence" provision, read literally, would treat a cross burning 
done as part ofa movie or play as the same as a cross burned 
on the property ofanother person without that person's con­
sent. Both acts ofcross burning would give rise to the infer­
ence that the cross burning was committed with the intent to 
intimidate, thus creating a possibility that a person may be 
prosecuted and convicted for engaging in lawful political 
speech, like burning a cross for filmmaking purposes. For the 
Court, therefore, this prima facie evidence provision would 
"create an unacceptable risk ofthe suppression ofideas." Id. 
Although the Court struck down Virginia's cross burning 
statute, it took pains to emphasize that carefully tailored cross­
burning statutes may survive First Amendment scrutiny. To 
be sure, states and localities may not prohibit cross burning 
conducted as an attempt to symbolize "shared group identity 
and ideology," because, according to the Court, ritualistic 
cross burning is a form ofcore symbolic political speech that is 
protected by the First Amendment. In reaching this conclu­
sion, the Court emphasized that"[t ]hroughout the history of 
the Klan, cross burnings have also remained potent symbols of 
shared group identity and ideology." Id. at 1546. The burning 
cross is a central ritual ofKlan gatherings, and it is also inti­
mately connected with the religious beliefs ofKlan members. 
The Court noted that"[t ]ypically, a cross burning would start 
with a prayer by the 'Klavern' minister, followed by the singing 
ofOnward Christian Soldiers." Id. 
The Court, however, distinguished cross burning as a 
symbolization of shared group identity and ideology from 
cross burning as a historically based form of intimidation. 
The Court noted that ''when a cross burning is directed at a 
particular person not affiliated with the Klan, the burning 
cross often serves as a message of intimidation, designed to 
inspire in the victim a fear ofbodily harm." Id. To buttress its 
conclusion that there is a strong, historically based associa­
tion between cross burning and violence, the Court devoted 
several pages to discuss the historical association between the 
Ku Klux Klan and the use ofa burning cross as "a tool of in­
timidation and a threat of impending violence." Id. at 1545. 
For example, the Court noted that in Miami in 1941, the 
Klan used cross burning to help reinforce racially segregated 
housing patterns. "The Klan burned four crosses in front of 
a proposed housing project, declaring, 'We are here to keep 
niggers out of town.... When the law fails you, call on us."' 
Id. (quoting S. KENNEDY, SOUTHERN EXPOSURE 176 (1991) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Similarly, in 1949 in 
Richmond, Virginia, the Klan burned a cross on the front 
yard of an African American school teacher who had just 
moved into a block formerly occupied only by whites. After 
the cross burning, the school teacher felt compelled to ask the 
police for protection. Id. 
The Court also emphasized that, historically, the Klan 
used cross burning to terrorize people not just on the basis of 
race or religion, but as "embodied threats to [all] people 
whom the Klan deemed antithetical to its goals." Id. It noted 
that, "in Alabama in 1942, in 'a whirlwind climax to weeks 
offlogging and terror,' the Klan burned crosses in front ofa 
union hall on the eve of a labor election," id. (quoting 
KENNEDY, supra, at 180), and that a rash ofcross burning in­
cidents in the late 1940s compelled the then governor ofVir­
ginia to state "that he would 'not allow any ofour people of 
any race to be subjected to terrorism or intimidation in any 
form by the Klan or any other organization."'2 
Thus, given the strong historical link between the cross 
burning and violence, the Court held that cross burning with 
the intent to intimidate may be prohibited, even though such 
a prohibition would constitute "content based discrimina­
tion." The Court acknowledged such a prohibition is con­
tent-based discrimination, because even cross burning with 
the intent to intimidate still is conveying a message; it is still a 
means ofcommunication. That message, however, is limited 
to the message ofintimidation. Such speech, the Court held, 
falls outside of the protection of the First Amendment and 
may be prohibited. 
Moreover, the Court reasoned that a state may constitu­
tionally prohibit a specific subset of acts of intimidation. 
Thus, a statute prohibiting a specific form of intimidation, 
cross burning, is constitutionally permissible, because "the 
basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the 
very reason the entire class ofspeech at issue is proscribable, 
no significant danger ofidea or viewpoint discrimination ex­
ists." Id. at 1549. In other words, because, as a general mat­
ter, statements or acts seeking to intimidate others fall outside 
of the protection of the First Amendment, a state may con­
stitutionally prohibit specific statements seeking to intimi­
date, so long as it does so for the same reason that the gener­
al act of intimidation may be prohibited. The Court 
analogized a prohibition on cross burning conducted with 
the intent to intimidate to federal statutes that specifically 
prohibit threats ofviolence directed against the United States 
president. Similarly, the Court analogized a prohibition on 
cross burning with the intent to intimidate to statutes that 
prohibit specific categories ofobscenity that it deems to be 
most patently offensive because of their prurience. Thus, ifa 
state chooses to specifically ban cross burning as a most vir­
ulent and destructive method of intimidation, such a statute 
is constitutional, because the reason for specifically prohibit­
ing a certain method of intimidation is for the same reason 
that all acts and messages ofintimidation are proscribable. 
The Court, in upholding Virginia's statute, distinguished it 
from the ordinance it struck down in R.A. V v. St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377 (1991), which unconstitutionally prohibited cross 
burning conducted with "knowledge or reasonable grounds to 
know that the cross burning would arouse anger, alarm or re­
sentment in others on the basis ofrace, color, creed, religion or 
gender."ST.PAUL,MlNN.,LEGIS. CODE§ 292.02 (1990).The 
St. Paul ordinance was unconstitutional for two reasons. First, 
the ordinance engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimina­
tion, because it prohibited cross burning directed only "toward 
one ofthe specified disfavored topics" ofrace, color, creed, re-
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ligion or gender, Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting R.A. V., 505 
U.S. at 391), but permitted cross burning conducted on the 
basis ofother topics, such as hatred toward lawyers or unions. 
The Court in Black reasoned, however, that Virginia's statute 
does not engage in such similar viewpoint discrimination, be­
cause the statute prohibits all cross burnings done with the in­
tent to intimidate, rather than prohibiting only cross burnings 
done with the intent to intimidate for a particular reason or tar­
geted against a specific racial or religious group. 
Second, Justice O'Connor emphasized another significant 
difference between the constitutionally valid Virginia statute 
and the constitutionally infirm St. Paul ordinance. The St. 
Paul ordinance prohibited cross burning that causes "anger 
and resentment" in a person. For the Court, government may 
regulate speech intended to invoke feelings of terror and in­
timidation, but it may not regulate speech intended to invoke 
merely feelings ofanger and resentment. The Court empha­
sized this distinction between cross burning made in an at­
tempt to arouse anger and hatred versus cross-burning made 
in an attempt to intimidate, primarily to protect cross-burning 
as a form ofpolitical expression. Cross-burning at a Ku Klux 
Klan rally, for example, may, "even at a political rally, arouse a 
sense of anger or hatred among the vast majority ofcitizens 
who see a burning cross. But this sense ofanger or hatred is 
not sufficient to ban all cross burnings." Id Dissenting or con­
troversial political speech often is expressed to arouse anger 
and resentment in its target audience, as is arguably the case 
with flag burning as a means of political expression. Such 
speech, however, is core political speech that deserves the 
strongest First Amendment protection. 
The import ofthe Court's decision in Black is that narrow­
ly tailored statutes banning cross-burning will survive First 
Amendment scrutiny, so long as the statute prohibits cross­
burning as a category of"true threats" and if it does not pro­
hibit cross-burning intended to intimidate based on a specif­
ic content (e.g., intent to intimidate on the basis ofrace). 
Moreover, although the Court struck down Virginia's 
"prirna facie evidence provision'' as interpreted by the Virginia 
Model]ury Instructions, the Court did leave room open for the 
possibility that a more carefully drafted "prima facie evidence 
provision'' may survive a First Amendment challenge. For ex­
ample, a prima facie evidence provision may pass constitu­
tional muster if an inference of intent to intimidate is raised 
only when a cross is burned on the property ofanother with­
out that person's consent, or when a cross is burned according 
to historically based methods associated with intimidation 
and violence. Such a provision would more clearly separate 
out those cross burnings committed with the intent to intim­
idate from those cross burnings conducted as expressions of 
"group identity and ideology." 
In upholding the authority ofstates to regulate cross burn­
ing carrying the threat ofviolence and intimidation, however, 
the Court failed to clearly articulate a principle to explain why 
it matters, for First Amendment purposes, whether a statute 
proscribes cross burning conducted as an expression ofracist 
ideology or whether a statute proscribes cross burning con­
ducted with the intent to intimidate. That is because the 
Court permits the government to engage in viewpoint and 
content discrimination to regulate racist speech in other con­
texts. Most notably, as noted by First Amendment scholars, 
the government has regulated racist speech in the workplace 
context. Under Title VII, the federal statute prohibiting racial 
discrimination in the workplace, for example, pervasive hostile 
speech made on the basis of race in the workplace may give 
rise to a Title VII "hostile work environment" claim.3 Thus, if 
an employer permitted its employees to burn a cross at the 
workplace, it is likely that racial minority employees would 
have a very strong "hostile work environment" claim against 
his or her employer for permitting such conduct. In this situ­
ation, it would seem difficult to analytically distinguish a cross 
burned at the workplace as a means ofexpressing a beliefin 
white supremacy and a cross burned at the workplace as a 
means ofintimidating another person. But, if the holding of 
Black is extended to Title VII hostile work environment 
claims, a court would be compelled to conclude that one form 
ofcross burning at the workplace is constitutionally protect­
ed speech, while the other form ofcross burning is not. That 
result would be difficult to defend, because from the perspec­
tive ofemployees subjected to the cross burning, both types 
of cross burning would seem to create the conditions for a 
hostile work environment claim. 4 
Ofcourse, the Court may distinguish cross burning at the 
workplace from cross burning at a Ku Klux Klan rally. The 
Court may contend that cross burning at the workplace is 
prohibitable under Title VII, because such cross burning is 
being targeted at a ·'captive audience." Or, the Court may 
contend that such cross burning is permissible as a regula­
tion of time, place, and manner. Whether those are nlid 
bases to distinguish cross burning at the workplace from cross 
burning at a political rally, the crucial point is that the basis 
for making such a distinction does not fall on whether the 
cross burning is a form ofpolitical expression or whether it is 
a tool ofintimidation. Given that Title VII arguably engages 
in content and viewpoint discrimination when it gives racial 
groups a cause ofaction based on the racist, political speech 
of their employers or fellow employees, the Court does not 
provide a meaningful answer when it states that government 
cannot prohibit cross burning at a political rally because such 
a prohibition discriminates on the basis ofcontent. That an­
swer, the answer provided in Black, merely begs the follow­
ing question: why does the Court permit the government to 
engage in viewpoint discrimination and prohibit derogatory, 
racist remarks in the workplace, but not similarly permit 
viewpoint regulation of derogatory, racist, speech in other 
contexts, as at a Ku Klux Klan rally? 
In any event, to assist state and local government officials 
in understanding the scope of their authority when it comes 
to regulating certain acts that may potentially be protected by 
the First Amendment, such as cross burning, the Court 
should articulate clearer principles to explain under what 
circumstances the government may appropriately engage in 
content and viewpoint discrimination. Such clear and artic­
ulate principles would provide much needed guidance to 
continued on page 15 
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Use L.Rep. 47 (3/12/2003)). The reasonable duck rule, under 
which the Corps regulated isolated wetlands ifa duck flying 
across interstate boundaries might use them, may yet fly again 
ifCongress does overrule SWANCC and either the wildlife­
sensitive rationale ofGDF or the economic activity rationale 
ofRancho Viejo are sustained by the Supreme Court. 
Takings-Removal-Ripeness. This conundrum is a 
favorite of mine. In Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), the 
Supreme Court required a landowner to exhaust state tradi­
tional court compensation remedies before going to federal 
court. However, in City ofChicago v. International College of 
Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997), the very same Supreme Court 
said that a municipal defendant in a takings claim which had 
been brought in state court pursuant to Williamson could re­
move that case to federal court. 
An enterprising landowner claimed that the decision in 
City of Chicago in effect modified or partly overruled 
Williamson. He argued that the Supreme Court could not 
have intended to require a plaintiff to sue in a state forum, but 
to give the defendants the option ofeither continuing in state 
court or removing to federal court. He objected to entitling 
the defendant, although not the plaintiff, to determine that 
the case should be heard in federal court. 
This seemingly clever argument was rejected by the Cir­
cuit on February 13, 2003. Kottschade v. City ofRochester, 319 
F3d 1038 (8th Cir.2003). While the situation may be anom­
alous, the Eighth Circuit said, there is no indication that the 
Supreme Court intended to overrule Williamson when it al­
lowed removal of takings claims by defendants to federal 
courts in the City ofChicago case. 
In addition, the court declined the plaintiff's request to 
determine that he could come back to federal court, and relit­
igate all his factual claims, after ripening his case in state 
court. The court felt it premature to determine what resjudi­
cata or collateral estoppel effects might flow from a state 
court adjudication. 
Moratoria-Settlements-Damages. In Tahoe-Sierra 
RegionalPreservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court held, 
in a ruling lauded by local government, that moratoria were 
not automatically takings which required payment ofdam­
ages. This ruling did notward offa suit brought by North Key 
Largo, Florida landowners against Monroe County for a tem­
porary taking based on an eight year hold on development. 
OnJuly 17, 2001, the trial court, having found a 98 percent 
diminution in value under the moratorium-from $5,887, 700 
to $14 5 ,000-held that a taking had occurred. A jury trial was 
then scheduled to determine damages. On May 4, on the eve 
ofthe trial, the case settled for $5. 9 million, believed to be the 
largest temporary takings recovery in U.S. history, according 
to Land Use Law Report. This amount, coincidentally, equals 
the $5.9 million the county paid for the land when it pur­
chased it in 1990. Shadek v. Monroe County Board ofCounty 
Commissioners, (C.A.P. 95-398, settlement announced March 
4, 2003), reported in 31 Land Use L.Rep. 43 (3/12/2003). 
This is an extreme case. However, it demonstrates that ju­
bilant predictions by either landowners or governments con­
cerning Supreme Court land use decisions tend to give way 
to more nuanced results when cases are actually fought out 
in the trenches. Clearly the trial judge in this case did not find 
in the Tahoe-Sierra decision grounds for vacating his prior 
ruling that the moratorium had constituted a taking even if 
moratoria are not a per se taking. 
Elementary Schools-Free Speech-Cruelty to Ani­
mals. And finally, on April 15 the Third Circuit held that a 
school could prevent a nine year old third grader from circulat­
ing a petition opposing a class field trip to the circus. The peti­
tion had stated, "we third grade kids don't want to go to the cir­
cus because they hurt animals." The youngster had obtained 
more than thirty signatures. When she continued her efforts at 
a class recess, the teacher told her to put the petition away. 
Although she was never punished, the student sued. An 
issue in the case was whether Tinker v. Des Moines Indepen­
dent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), even applied in ele­
mentary schools. The majority held that Tinker, which said 
the First Amendment did apply in high schools, had more 
limited applicability to elementary schools, stating that "if 
third graders enjoy rights under Tinker, those rights would 
necessarily be very limited." Because the student had not 
even been disciplined, and there was no punishment for her 
expression, the court found no First Amendment violation. 
One concurring judge, however, reached the same result on 
a different basis-he was willing to assume there was a right 
to petition, but that the school had not materially interfered 
with it because it had on several occasions allowed her to ob­
tain signatures. Walker-Serrano v. Leonard, 71U.S.L.W.1659 
(3d Cir. 4/15/03). 
And so it goes. 
Supreme Court Watch 
(continued from page 13) 
state or local governments seeking to regulate certain acts, 
like cross burning, in order to fulfill theirThirteenth Amend­
ment duty to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery,5 
and their Fourteenth Amendment duty to ensure all of their 
residents the equal protection of the laws. 
Endnotes 
1. ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer and Stevens joined Justice O'Con­
nor's plurality opinion. Justices Scalia and Stevens wrote separate concurrences. Justice 
Souter, joined byJustices Ginsburg and Kennedy, filed an opinion concurring in the 
judgment and dissenting in part.Justice Souter concluded that the statute makes an un­
constitutional content-based distinction, and that no exception should save the statute 
from invalidation. Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, because he would have 
upheld the statute, including the prima facie evidence provision. 
2. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1545 (quoting D. CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM: THE 
HISTORY OF THE Ku KLUX KLAN 333 (1980)). The rash ofcross burning incidents in 
the late 1940s catalyzed the Commonwealth ofVirginia to pass its first version ofits 
cross burning statute in 1950. Id 
3. See, e.g., Kingsley Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Work Environment Ha­
rassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991). 
4. See United States v. City ofBuffitlo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 633 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (hos­
tile work environment claim brought on basis ofposters posted at police station stating 
"The KKK is still alive."). 
5. See Akhil Amar, The Case ofthe Missing Amendments: RA. V. v. City ofSt. Paul, 106 
HARv. L. REv. 124 (1992) (arguing thatThirteenth Amendment rrilght allow regulation of 
cross burning as an attempt to eliminate cross burning as a badge and incident ofslavery). 
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